The rich revenue gained from a mobile application (a.k.a. app) boost app owners (sellers) to manipulate the app store with fake ratings. One effective way to hire fake rating providers is bribery. The fake ratings given by the bribed buyers influence the evaluation of the app, which further have an impact on the decisionmaking of potential buyers. In this paper, we study bribery in a rating system with multiple sellers and buyers, which extends the single seller situation discussed in [5] . We analyze the effect of bribing strategy using game theory methodology and examine the existence of its an equilibrium state, in which the rating system is expected to be bribery-proof: no bribery strategy yields a strictly positive expected gain to the seller. Our study first concentrates on the analysis of the static game with a fixed number of sellers and buyers, then we model a real-world setting towards a dynamic game. On top of our analysis, we conclude that at least one Nash equilibrium can be reached in the bribery game of the rating system.
Introduction
In e-marketplaces (e.g. app store), buyers select reputable items (e.g. apps) offered by sellers based on their direct experiences and ratings from other buyers. However, it is infeasible for a buyer to interact with all sellers in order to gain the direct experience. As a result, trust/reputation system evaluated on ratings or reviews, act as a crucial tool to support buyers' decision-making [8] . Various studies have demonstrated that high profit is attached with high reputation.
A study of eBay conducted by Resnick et al. revealed that buyers were willing to pay 8% more to the item offered by reputable sellers than that provided by new sellers [12] . Ye et al. [18] in their study showed that a 10% improvement in reviewers rating can increase the number of bookings in a hotel by 4.4%. Driven by profit, sellers have incentives to perform unfair rating attacks by bribing buyers and increase their aggregated evaluation above their competitors as this increases market share and overall revenues. Fake ratings have been reported on a real world movie dataset collected by Cao et al. [1] , the fake ratings dominate the rating distribution in the first few days as soon as the movie is released. The fake ratings are mainly divided into two categories, fake positive ratings to boost the reputation of the sellers owner and dishonest negative ratings to decrease the reputation of their competitors. The appearance of underground market specially for bribery in providing fake ratings make the problem even worse [13] .
Two potential reasons attract the sellers to bribe "bot farms" or "human water armies" [16] to inflate the App downloads, ratings and reviews. The first is the rating or review sparsity. From our analysis on Google Play app store, the rating ratio is as low as 2.1% based on our crawled top more than 20,000 apps [19] . That is, about 2 out of 100 buyers or users of the app rate their ratings or reviews on the platform. In such situation, app owners can easily increase the positive evaluation of their app by bribing buyers with a compensation, monetary or not. That is, sellers exchange for positive ratings by bribing a group of buyers with certain payment. The positive ratings further influence the sellers' future revenues. The second reason is the attractive revenue gained from temporal (usually in a daily basis) top app ranking. App developers resort to fraudulent means to deliberately boost up their app ranking on an App store [20] . In this paper, we analyze the effect of bribing strategy by defining the utility function as well as strategy space for each seller. On top of that, we model the problem as economic game and examine whether an equilibrium state is existed, in which the rating system is expected to be bribery-proof: no individual seller want to perform any bribery strategy.
In single-player decision theory the key notion is that of an optimal strategy, that is, a strategy that maximizes the players expected payoff for a given environment in which the player operates such as discussed in [9, 5] . Such a situation in the single-player case can be fraught with uncertainty, since the environment might be stochastic, partially observable, and spring all kinds of surprises on the player. In our work, we consider the case with a multi-player setting. In which the environment consists of other players, all of whom are also willing to maximize their payoffs. As a result, the notion of an optimal strategy for a given players is not meaningful as the best strategy also depends on the choices of others. The equilibrium state is reached when all players perform their best strategy considering others players' strategies. We argue the multi-player setting is even more complex and challenging than that with a single-agent setting. In the multi-player setting, we model the sellers as players, and map the bribing behavior into strategy space in game theory. Based on the model, we intend to find the equilibrium state within all combinations of sellers' strategies. To simplify our analysis, we will be using the terms "seller", "player" or "app owner" interchangeably.
In detail, we first consider the static game, in which the number of sellers and buyers are fixed in a time slot. We show the strategy space is exponential increase with the number of sellers and buyers. To find the equilibrium state in the static game, we devise a greedy algorithm to eliminate the dominated strategies. As the rating system in realworld is indeed a dynamic game, that is, the buyers in the market is dynamic in and out, their payoff is dynamically changed with time. We extend our findings in static game to games in which the payoffs are dynamically changed with time, or are dependent on the strategy profiles of the players. While games in which the payoffs are constant have received much attention, games with dynamic payoffs have not been studied extensively in literature. We show in this paper that how such games can model bribery in rating system closely. Fitted exponential function 1e3 Fitted curve with 50.0% confidence interval (a) Scatter plot of 1609 apps from Apple app store on their averaged rating and the number of reviews received in the following month. # of reviews in the following 7 months 1e4 All genres (16422 Apps) Business (621 Apps) Game (4263 Apps) (b) Lineplot of apps with different genres in Google Play on their averaged rating and the number of reviews received in the following 7 months. Our contributions:
• We extend the bribery problem in rating system to multiple sellers and buyers situation, and explicit interpret the problem from a game theory perspective. • On top of the model, we analyze the effect of bribing strategies in case of static and dynamic games. In static game, we found Nash equilibrium exists in sellers' strategy space and too many buyers are bribed under Nash equilibrium compared to the social optimum. In dynamic game where the payoff is uncertain, we transform it into complete but imperfect game and analyze the best response for sellers based on their own beliefs. • Based on our analysis, we further quantify the effect of fair ratings.
That is, to what extent fair ratings from normal users can resist to bribery in rating system.
We model the relation between rating and its corresponding profit (evaluated in the number of installs) in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally define the game settings and focus on analyzing the bribing strategies in static game. Section 4 extends the game into dynamic setting, where the payoffs of the player is uncertain. We discuss the effect of fair ratings as well as how to estimate the current bribery level of a system in Section 5. The paper is rounded off with conclusion on our mail findings in Section 6.
Profit Modeling and Related Work
We collect real-world data to show how our problem can be represented as economic game. By crawling the statistical data (rating, reviews) of 1609 apps from Apple App Store during December 2016 to May 2017 and the data of rating, app genre, reviews, installs on 16422 apps from Google Play, we first model the relation between rating and its potential profit in the number of installs. Although individual apps may exhibit different patterns between rating and their installs, we study whether the overall pattern is consistent between apps from different app stores or app genres. We found higher-rated apps get more reviews (ratings) even they are in different app sotresor within different app genres, as shown in Figure 1 (a) and (b). We note the relation between the rating r and the number reviews Nrev received based on the ratings follows a power function:
where a = 0. As not all buyers score their rating after purchase, our rating data cannot accurately capture the relation between rating and the transaction volume. We further show the scatter plot of the number of reviews and installs on apps in Figure 1 (c). We examine two reasons that can potentially explain the extent to which a direct plot on ratings and installs of apps is not a plausible attempt. The first is that the number of installs is highly skewed. The second is the number of installs in Google Play is an estimate on the order of magnitude of downloads. From Figure 1 (c), we can see the log scale of the number of installs Nins is proportional to the log scale of the number of reviews Nrev. That is:
where a = 0. Substituting Equation (1) into Equation (2), we have:
where Ω1 = a b and Ω2 = n · b. The number of installs based on ratings also shows a snowball effect, when a few buyers explore a good app, everyone else wants to pile it on. On top of the observation, app owners competed to increase their app evaluation in order to increase their purchase revenue. For a single seller, with limited number of buyers, maximizing its own payoff will influence one another's welfare. To this end, the problem can be represented as economic game. To present our model, we assume in the rating system, each seller can observe the current buyers of other sellers', as well as the current evaluation from the buyers. The common knowledge in our game: a). The players are rational, meaning they hoping to maximize their payoffs. b). In static game, all the players know their own payoffs as well as others, but also that all the players know that all the players know all the players' payoffs, and that all the players know that all the players know that all the players know all the players' payoffs, and so on, ad infinitum. We first let the number of buyers be constant in static game, the bribery space for a seller is the buyers that have not interacted with that seller. We relax the restriction in dynamic game, in which new buyers are considered in the strategy space.
In deed, our study can be applied to all rating-based systems in which individuals influence the decision of one other in the opinion they give and bribery can disrupt buyers to interact with fake reputable sellers.
Related research lines: Our approach relates to several research lines in computational social choice, game theory and reputation systems.
Computational social choice In our studied rating system, sellers trying to influence potential buyers' decisions to maximize their own expected payoff. The problem is analogous to lobbying and bribery in computational social choice, where agents manipulate or modify their outcomes to reach their objectives [2, 3] . Lobbying and bribery are established concepts in computational social choice, the research range from the seminal contribution of [6] to recent studies such as vote buying in [11] . Reputation systems Dishonest ratings influence the accuracy of reputation evaluation, hence, a robust reputation system should detect the attacks and mitigate the influence caused by the attacks [17] . Otherwise, the disruptive reputation can influence other agents. In this sense, ours can be seen as a study of reputation in Multi-agent systems [7] . To analyse the harm of unfair ratings, more recent studies based on information theory are proposed in papers [14] and [15] .
Static Game
Consider within a time slot, M sellers denote as S and N buyers denote as B in the app store. Each seller has their app (one-to-one mapping) released on the app store, the app is evaluated by a finite set of buyers Bi = {b1, b2, ..., b l }, l <= N . In our context, we focus our analysis on homogeneous apps. low rated app owner intend to bribe a set of buyers to increase its app evaluation. We assume one buyer can only bribed by one seller. The scored rating is proportional to the payment. For fair rater, based on his experience, he submits a rating to evaluate the app. All the ratings r are drawn from a set of values r ∈ [0, 1]. Although discrete assignment of 1 to 5 stars are common in online rating systems, such as Amazon, Apple store and Google play etc., the stars can be mapped onto [0, 1] interval to simplify the analysis.
We study the rating systems such as used in Apple store, every interested buyers can see the evaluation of other buyers. Buyer paid for the app can evaluate it, and the aggregation of the evaluation will influence potential buyers' decision. We represent the aggregated evaluation on the app of seller i as a function on the associated ratings Ri = {r1, r2, ..., r k }, k ≤ l (not all buyers score their evaluation) received: V al(Ri) = avg(Ri), where avg is the average function across all real-valued ratings. For short, we denoteri = avg(Ri).
Suppose in a time slot (e.g. app is released or updated in the market), all the sellers perform bribery strategy to increase their app evaluation and therefore the profit based on their current rating distribution. We define the strategy of sellers in the form of an ensemble of individual strategies: Definition 1. An individual strategy on buyer b is the amount of effort φ(b) required to improve its current rating to a new rating. We denote: φ(b) → [0, +∞). A strategy of a seller is an ensemble of individual strategies on each buyer b ∈ B φ , such that
Under bribery, buyer's evaluation is closed under min1, x + y for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]. To compare with the results of [5] , we adopt that the bribed cost is proportional to buyer's rating. For example, buyer bj's evaluation is 0.5, when it bribed by seller i with φ(bj) = 0.6, the new evaluation will be min{1, x + y} = min{1, 1.1} = 1. By definition 1, the total cost for seller i to perform a bribery on a set of buyers B φ is b∈B φ φ(b).
Next, we define the potential utility to seller i can be gained from bribing a set of buyers. Theoretically, a seller can bribe all the available buyers in the market, however, the potential value will approach zero because of no future interaction. Since few bribed sellers have substantial profit to obtain, adding one more may do little harm to those already bribed sellers, but when so many sellers are bribing that they are all just barely having no profit or losing their bribery payment. In this section, to simplify our analysis, we assume the utility that a seller gets is proportionality to its aggregated rating. That is, we let Ω2 = 1 in Equation (3). The assumption does not influence our final conclusion. Definition 2. The expected utility of a seller i is a function:
where N = N − M i |Bi| is the potential buyers in the market, k is the profit from an app purchase.
The utility of a seller i amounts to the number of potential buyers in the markets and the rating rated by the interacted buyers. The intuition behind is that buyers favor to download and use higher rated apps. Based on previous definitions, we can define the payoff of a bribery strategy.
Definition 3. Let φ be a strategy and B φ is the bribed buyers by φ. The payoff to seller i from φ is:
where u 0 is the initial utility and u φ is the utility after execution of φ.
Definition 4. Let φ and φ be feasible strategies for seller i. Strategy φ is strictly dominated by φ if for each feasible combination of the other players' strategies, i's payoff from playing φ is less than i's payoff from playing φ : π(φ1, ..., φi−1, φ , φi+1, ..., φn) < π(φ1, ..., φi−1, φ , φi+1, ..., φn)
for each (φ1, ..., φi−1, φi+1, ..., φn) that can be constructed from the other players' strategy spaces Φ1, Φi−1, Φi+1, ..., Φn. Let φ−i denote the strategy combination from players other than i. Then, if occasionally, π(φ , φ−i) = π(φ , φ−i), we denote φ is weakly dominated by φ .
Given the definition and the conclusion in paper [5] , a rational seller would prefer greedy strategy to others under same budget. In other words, strategy that bribing non-raters is always dominated. Let Algorithm 1 define the greedy bribing strategy.
Proposition 5. Under same combination strategies φ−i of other sellers', the greedy bribing strategy φ o for seller i is always dominates others with same budget B.
Proof. Let φ be any strategy. The payoff for seller i:
We omit φ−i when clear from the context.
Let B φ and B φ o be the bribed buyers under strategy φ and φ o respectively. 
i∈R i ri is the sum of received ratings before applying the strategy.
According to Algorithm 1, we can infer |B φ | ≥ |B φ o |. Therefore, we have:
Under same budget, it shows when bribes a buyer, it is worthy to bribe it completely to the highest rating.
We further analyze under what conditions the rating system is bribery-proof. Based on the above proposition, we are able to show that no strategy is profitable if the number of potential buyers is too low, i.e., the ratio between number of current rated buyers |Bi| and potential buyers greater than the profit of an item k. Lemma 6. For seller i, no strategy is profitable if:
Proof. Let φ be any strategy for seller i and i's current rated buyers Bi = ∅ . Then by definition 3, the payoff under φ with bribing budget B > 0 is:
According to proposition 5, greedy strategy dominates others. We give proof for greedy strategy here.
If strategy φ is profitable, then:
Therefore, for profitable strategy, we have:
From this it follows that for seller that have already bribed large number of buyers, further bribing may result in no profit.
In real world, a bad reputed seller is more desired to improved its aggregated evaluation by performing bribery strategy. In multi-player situation, an open question for seller i is whether a best response to other player's strategies is existed. In next section, we analyse the strategy space for each player and identify the best response in multiplayer situation.
Best Response
In previous section, we show that bribery more buyers may not result in more profit. When bribes one buyer, it is better to induce them to give highest rating. Because greedy strategy always dominates other strategies. However, in real word, a buyer who have given their rating may not willing to improve it. Thus, in this section, we redefine the game in this situation. Seller i's current status is its aggregated ratings ri amounts to the number of potential buyers in the market. For low V al(Ri), sellers will try to bribe new buyers to give rating 1. We define the strategy of a seller: a strategy φ for seller i is the number of buyers will be bribed φi. The strategy space [0, +∞) covers all the choices that could be of interest to seller i.
Based on Lemma 6, there is a maximum number of buyers that can be bribed by seller i in the market. For seller i, it is always profitable to bribe the interacted buyers if Lemma 6 holds. On the contrary, if interacted buyers can not improve their given rating, we are curious about how many buyers should be bribed for a seller to result in maximized profit.
The payoff to seller i from bribing φi buyers when the numbers of buyers bribed by the other sellers are (φ1, ..., φi−1, φi+1, ..., φn) is:
where u (φ i ,φ −i ) is utility for seller i after i's execution of φi and the others execution of φ−i respectively. Theorem 7. The bribery game G in rating system has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. From Nash theorem [10] , every game with a finite number of players and action profiles has at least one Nash equilibrium. In a bribery game, both the number of sellers and the strategy space is finite. Therefore, at least one Nash equilibrium can be reached in the game.
If (φ * 1 , ..., φ * n ) is to be a Nash equilibrium, then, for each i, φ * i must maximize 6 given that the other sellers choose (φ * 1 , ..., φ * i−1 , φ * i+1 , ..., φ * n ). The first-order condition for this optimization problem is:
That is:
Based on Lamma 6, for seller i, if |B i | N ≥ k, the optimal strategy for i would be φi = 0. The best response (φ * 1 , ..., φ * n ) will solve:
Subject to:
Example 1. Consider two sellers of duopoly game in a market. Each seller i with interacted buyers' Bi = 5 and j with Bj = 2 respectively. Those buyers can not bribe again by other bribery strategies. The average evaluation given by those buyers on i and j arē ri = 0.2 andrj = 0.5 respectively. The total number of buyers in the market is n = 20. The profit for bribing one buyer is k = 2. The strategy for the sellers is φi and φj. If (φi, φj) is to be a Nash equilibrium, according to the above statements, strategies should solve 6.
Substituting φi in equation 6 and expanding u φ i yields:
where M 0 is the number of interacted buyers in the market before performing the bribery. Each φi can be solved by computing all the sellers' first-order conditions under constraints 8. Solving the partial differential equations under the constraints yields: φi = 2, φj = 1.
In this example, the first 4 strategies for both seller dominant others, we further present the bribery problem in the accompanying bimatrix 1. The above result can also be derived by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. In Table 1 , both seller i and j has four strategies. For seller j, strategy 1 strictly dominates the others, so a rational seller j will play strategies 1 anyway. Thus, if seller i knows that seller j is rational then seller i can eliminate strategies 0, 2 and 3 from seller i strategy space. In the second column, seller i's strategy 2 strictly dominates the others, leaving (6.57, 12.33) as the outcome of the game.
We also plot seller i's payoff in Figure 2 . In the figure, when the strategy is larger than 4, the payoff is decreased linearly. This is consistent with Lemma 6 that bribed more buyers may not have more profit. In contrast to individual maximized payoff, the social optimum
Let
. As a consequence of Theorem 7 we obtain: 
Because φ * i is the number of bribed buyers for seller i that can maximize π(φ i , φ −i ). By definition, π(φ * i , φ −i ) > π(φ * * i , φ −i ). Then, to maximize the social welfare, we have:
. Thus contradicted with our assumption that O * * is the social optimum.
The corollary illustrates the problem of commons [4] , where the common resource is overutilized because each seller considers only his or her own incentives, not the effect of his or her actions on the other sellers. In general, cooperative behavior is more desirable for the general good, but competitive behavior may bring higher individual gain.
Game under Uncertainty
The number of buyers is dynamic changed with time in a real-world setting. In this section, we analyze the game under uncertain, dynamic situation. As the number of buyers fluctuates with time, we define games with dynamic payoffs, and how these games are different from the usual games. Then, we describe the bribery game in dynamic number of buyers. Finally, we present the model employed and the results obtained from the analysis.
The game forms discussed so far assumed that all sellers know what game is being played. Specifically, the number of sellers, the number of potential buyers, the actions available to each seller, and the payoff associated with each action vector, have all been assumed to be common knowledge among the seller. We say the game have complete information if everyone knows everyones payoff function, and everyone knows everyone knows this, and so on ad infinitum. In contrast, incomplete information means that players are not sure what the other players in the game are like, as defined by their payoff functions, or what they know about other players. In real world situation, such as the bribery problem discussed here, player do not have complete information about everyone they interact with. This lack of common knowledge can greatly add to the complexity of a game, and the possible strategies that players might adopt. One immediate problem of solving games with incomplete information is that the techniques so far discussed cannot be directly applied to these situations. This is because they all make the fundamental assumption that players know which game they are playing. This is not the case if players are unsure what their opponents are like. The beliefs of the different sellers on the number of potential buyers result in different action of each seller. For example, given a player with a high percentage of low ratings and its positive belief about the number of potential buyers, he would prefer a more aggressive bribery action against other players. However, it turns out that these other types of uncertainty can be reduced to uncertainty only about payoffs. In our payoff definition 3, the uncertainty of potential buyers directly lead to the uncertainty of payoff.
Let us reconsider a variant of the game studied in previous section, in which each player i knows his own belief on the number of potential buyers but is uncertain of the other players beliefs. The belief of the seller is represented by the probability distribution on his strategy space. Given a seller's belief, the expected payoff from playing strategy φi is π(φi)p(φi|λ(t)), where λ(t) dynamic rate of potential buyers following the Poisson distribution at time t.
We describe the sequence of the game as follows:
1. Seller 1 chooses a strategy φ1 from the feasible strategy set based on his beliefs. 2. Seller i chooses a strategy φi from the feasible strategy set based on his beliefs. 3. Payoffs are πi(φi)p(φi|λ(t)) for each seller i.
However, in one stage, sellers also can choose to perform strategy without bribing any buyers. The strategy from later seller may condition their actions upon the actions of at least of one other seller in the game. As previously stated, sellers are uncertain about other sellers' strategies. The seller knows its own beliefs about the number of potential buyers.
If we assume the number of potential buyers as static, from Theory 7, the sellers' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. However, in dynamic context, no seller knows the number of potential buyers n. This uncertainty is expressed as the possibility distribution on n. Given n, the optimal strategy can be referred by Lemma 6. Under dynamic situation, the expected payoff for seller i is defined as:
where φ ≺k is the strategies chose by the sellers before seller k. p(φ k j|φ ≺k ) denotes the probability to choose strategy kj for seller k after observing other sellers' strategies φ ≺k .
The best response for seller i is try to solve:
The equilibrium concept used here is Bayesian Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Each seller has no incentive to deviate from its best response.
Discussion
By discussion, we show how fair ratings act as an important role in resisting bribery. Although according to proposition 5, greedy strategy dominates others, but in fair rating situation, the scored rating by those fair raters can not be bribed. We analyse the effect of fair ratings under following settings.
To clear our analysis, we denote the number of fair ratings for seller i as N F i , the aggregated rating value of fair raters as r F i . Then the current aggregate evaluation of i is |Bi| + r F i . We quantify the effect of fair ratings by analyzing the utility of seller. Initially, the utility for seller i is: u 0 = NB · k. When a group of honest buyer score a set of fair ratings, the utility will be: u f = (N −N F i )
it is the critical point for seller i to be bribery-proof. Meaning, no strategy can profit with number of fair raters larger than N F i . Such result appeals for incentives that can attract fair raters give their rating in the system.
Conclusion
We formally define the bribing behaviors of sellers in the rating system and analyze its effect using game theory. Sellers and their bribing behaviors are mapped into players and the corresponding strategy space in the game. In the static game, where the sellers and buyers are static and their payoffs are common knowledge, we found Nash equilibrium is existed in the system when all sellers perform their best-bribing strategy. In the equilibrium state, the system is not only bribery-proof but also has the problem of commons among sellers. In the dynamic game, we slice the game into a subgame for analysis. In each subgame, Bayesian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium does exist when all seller selects the strategy that can maximize their expected payoffs.
